- [['Will [[Russia]] control [[Kherson]] on 10/31/22']] :
	- Looked at Ukraine War Map (@war.mapper) over time to get a sense of the mass spreading of both sides.
	- It seems like the Russo-Ukrainian war has become mostly a [[war]] of [[attrition]], judging by the reports of 500-1000 casualties a day on the Ukrainian side through private channels and Western estimates, and around that or more on the Russia side from [[media]] sources. All this combined with minimal shifting of [[territory]] in the last few months.
	- @auditor_ya on [[Twitter]], a seeming Ukrainian [[OSINT]] digester, has [[maps]] that echo @war.mapper.
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		- A Russian [[attack]] from the Donetsk area toward Avdivka used close [[air]] [[support]].
	- Low [[cost]], improvised [[drone]] technology seems to be experiencing a higher rate of [[innovation]] on the Ukrainian side.
	- Russian media (RBC) reports civilians returning to Kherson.
	- Checked @ukra_satflash on Twitter for back of the napkin advance of explosions.
	- Will Russia use nukes or other unexpected [[weapons]]?
	- Will Ukraine get better at [[strategy]]?
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		- Russia seems to have learned from the opening months of the war and appears to be operating more like a modern military in full swing now.
		- Ukraine has Western economic support, and its institutions have taken over many hidden logistical aspects of the war away from people who were fired up to defend their homeland- does this mean that there is less fire to fight among the population, as well?
	- By the best estimates of positions in the last month, Ukraine has held the [[high]] [[ground]] for awhile, and Russia was able to push up the coastal plains until it hit the high ground.
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		- The area northeast from Kherson would be a good approach, if the Dnipro is somehow taken and used amphibiously, and the flanks to the east are taken care of.
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			- Is this something Ukraine has the capability for?
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		- Ukrainian Naval Infantry numbered around 200 in 2014. They went through a crucible against militias in Donbass.
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			- Can't be more than 12,000 Marines, given the unit descriptions. So, probably 4-10,000. 
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				- Wikipedia says '6,000'.
		- Can Ukraine use the Dniprovska Gulf?
	- 'How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace':
		- Suggests that those who start wars will do worse as the [[war]] goes on, information in the war is used to decide more than information before the war, that stronger initiators are slower to update their guesses about whether they will win, and that the war will last the longer that people are [[uncertain]] about who would win.
			- Knowledge about relative [[rate]] of loss during the [[war]] seems more [[predictive]] than [[knowledge]] of [[resources]] and [[army]] size before the war started.
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				- It is very difficult to get any [[information]] on Ukrainian military [[deaths]], due to Ukrainian obfuscation. Private channels on the Ukrainian side suggested it was 100-500/day in May.
		- The longer the [[war]], the worse the expected outcome is for whoever started it.
	- Given that [[Russia]] started the war with [[Ukraine]] (or was it Russian [[neoreactionaries]]?), will it be more likely for Russians to take ground in the next few months?
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- Internal [[war]] that takes place far from a [[political]] [[center]] in areas with natural [[resources]] that people want internationally last longer than ones that are closer to a [[central]] [[government]].
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	- Higher rebel [[military]] ability increases the chances that a civil war will be shorter.
		- How far must the army move to fight? How long can they fight for?
- How does [[time]] interact with whatever is studied?