The perils of identityยง
I try to remind myself (despite using words like โIโ and โmyselfโ) that, in a
meaningful sense, โIโ donโt exist. Thereโs no essentialโฆ
The perils of identityยง
I try to remind myself (despite using words like โIโ and โmyselfโ) that, in a
meaningful sense, โIโ donโt exist. Thereโs no essential eternal personality
that drives my behavior; no soul sitting in a driverโs seat making executive
decisions. Instead, my behaviors are just that: behaviors, resulting
presumably from an interference pattern between many competing semi-autonomous
processes in my nervous system. The sense I have of myself is a model I have
created by observing my own behaviors and predicting my future behaviors
(something we know from experiment is very unreliable), and I donโt have any
special access to my real motivations that an outsider doesnโt โ instead, I
merely have a greater capacity for self-delusion. To myself and to others, I
am a loose collection of habits and biases, and the mechanisms that produce
those habits are of only academic interest.
I remind myself of this because Iโve seen the kinds of mistakes that tend to
happen when I forget โ and the kinds of mistakes that happen when others
forget. Itโs easy to apply selective memory based on failed predictions: โI
would never have done that , so something else must have caused it; Iโm a
good person so there must have been extenuating circumstances.โ Peopleโs
models of their own behavior are subject to cache poisoning, and comparing to
vague normative models (โI am a good person โ) produces perverse incentives
toward systematic self-delusion. However, you are what you pretend to be โ or,
more accurately, your behavior determines which classification you and others
would be best off applying in order to predict your future behavior โ and so
if you have a goal model (such as being a good person) youโre best off
focusing on your failures rather than your successes. Successfully achieving
such a goal is hard, miserable work โ falsely believing yourself to be
wonderful is easy and fun, since itโs all reward, while holding yourself to a
high standard requires mostly punishment โ but at the same time, the bar is
often very low because your peers give into the lure of intellectual
dishonesty.
When we get into groups the problem gets worse. Tribalism is processed on pre-
linguistic parts of the brain, and tribal behaviors will happen automatically
and without observation if you donโt make an effort to consciously observe
your own behavior. We perform gatekeeping, signalling, and shunning the
unbelievers automatically: what we emit seems like language, but it doesnโt
contain meaningful statements, or the statements it contains are tangential to
the intended signal and their truth values irrelevant.
I recently saw a bumper sticker that said โFrank Sinatra didnโt need a
websiteโ. Itโs a trivially true statement: Sinatra died prior to the invention
of the web, so he achieved his fame without websites. Genghis Khan didnโt need
a Big Mac; Jesus didnโt need a hot rod; Joan of Arc didnโt need a ballpoint
pen; Hitler didnโt need pokemon cards. Buying a bumper sticker and putting it
on your car isnโt something that happens without quite a lot of activity, and
manufacturing a bumper sticker requires even more, so putting an irrelevant
and trivially true statement on your car is rare. Obviously someone saw that
statement and decided it meant something about their personality โ presumably,
they identify with the first half of the twentieth century and see
technologies from the second half as belonging to the outgroup. Yet, the
actual content of the statement runs counter to the intended meaning here:
Sinatra didnโt have a website, sure, so he relied upon the Mafia, the print
media, the TV, radio, and record industries (all of which were new at the
time), and Las Vegas (a completely new city built from scratch for the purpose
of skirting regulations, with new entertainment industry structures and new
social technology like lounge clubs with performer exclusivity contracts); had
Sinatra been born later, he would have taken advantage of the web the same way
that he took advantage of radio and television. In other words, this bumper
sticker says nothing meaningful to anybody aside from indicating a vague and
incoherent bias on the part of the owner of the car. Such a bias can be
transmitted more effectively through symbols: rather than talking about Frank
Sinatra, why not get a decal of Humphrey Bogart? By separating our sense of
identity from our sense of group identity, we can reason about our own biases,
and not only can we hedge against them but we can seek to communicate them in
a more effective way.
Political memes are a major form of group signalling on Facebook. We all have
a friend who uses them too often. Signalling your politics isnโt without
value: political positions are, theoretically, proxies for your stance on
meta-ethical issues. Does life have inherent positive value or does it gain
value from its potential? Is it better to be forced to live well or to have
the opportunity to live poorly? Does intent matter or do only consequences
matter? Is the purpose of justice revenge or rehabilitation? Is it the
responsibility of the community to support itself, or is the community simply
a temporary structure for holding individuals without mutual responsibility?
These questions are theoretically answered by somebodyโs political position,
and they impact many different kinds of interactions which wouldnโt seem to
have a political dimension at first glance. However, without the ability to
step back from identification with oneโs political position, one is not able
to reason about intent: Am I trying to convince other people to adopt my
position? Am I trying to change or reinforce group norms? Am I trying to
indicate my position to peers in order to allow them to predict my future
behavior? Am I trying to indicate my position to strangers so that people who
agree with me will talk to me? Without the ability to step back from
identification, one cannot even reason about whether or not oneโs stated
political position is even an accurate reflection of oneโs beliefs: I donโt
believe that the purpose of justice is revenge & I think communities have a
responsibility toward their members, so maybe Iโm no longer a republican but
actually a communist. I think people should have the ability to choose how to
live their lives even if they make poor decisions, so maybe Iโm an anarchist.
I think a really crappy life is worse than no life at all so maybe I lean
toward anti-natalism. This kind of introspection is part of what makes labels
like these remain useful.
Imagining yourself to be a consistent and stable personality can be
comforting, and it can save effort in the same way that stereotypes save
effort: as long as deviations from the stereotype are unimportant & you donโt
enforce the stereotype by punishing people who donโt fit it, you can quickly
predict behaviors of large groups based on heuristics. Likewise, feeling like
you belong in a group and that members of that group are on the same
wavelength as you are is comforting. But you arenโt a stable personality, and
groups change; if you arenโt sufficiently intellectually honest you will lack
the flexibility to change the way you think of yourself in response to changes
in your behaviors, and you will be unable to leave a group that gives less and
less of value back to you.
By John Ohno on June 20,
2017.
[Canonical link](https://medium.com/@enkiv2/the-perils-of-
identity-7cd235e69ca2)
Exported from Medium on September 18, 2020.